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Summary
We report on a discrete-choice CV study conducted in Germany to value the WTP for
biodiversity protection in less developed countries. To systematically investigate survey
realism and subjective threat assessment from the loss of biodiversity described in the
scenario the study includes questions to uncover the constructs of Protection Motivation
Theory, which is introduced to the CV literature. The patterns of responses to such
questions are analysed using an Expectation-Maximization algorithm to derive class
membership probabilities. These are found to match the predictions of Protection
Motivation Theory and systematically improve the logistic analysis of the WTP
responses.
Keywords: Biodiversity valuation, Protection motivation theory, Latent class analysis,
Expectation-Maximization algorithm, Contingent valuation







Phone: +44 01904 434 791
Fax: +44 01904 432 998
E-mail: rs24@york.ac.uk  2 
 
1. Introduction 
The  convention  on  biological  diversity  considers  the  transfer  of  resources  from 
developed  countries,  with  relatively  low-biodiversity  and  high  opportunity  cost  of 
conservation, to developing countries with relatively high-biodiversity and low opportunity 
cost of conservation (CBD, 1992; Perrings, 1995). Such measure ensures, amongst other 
things, that money be allocated in conservation activities in locations where the marginal 
returns are high. However, its implementation poses at least two challenging questions. First, 
what is the appropriate amount of money to be transferred for the purpose of biodiversity 
conservation?  Such  issue  is  addressed  in  this  study  where  we  report  the  results  of  a 
contingent valuation (CV) survey asking a random sample of German residents to state their 
willingness to pay (WTP) for such conservation initiatives. 
The second challenge derives from the unique nature of biodiversity as a good of global 
public value and is linked to the perception of the consequences of its loss by respondents. In 
this paper we approach this second challenge in the context of the CV study and by drawing 
from  a  broad  research  program  in  social  psychology:  Protection  Motivation  Theory 
(henceforth PMT). Empirically, we explore  
1)  the  potential  that  PMT  affords  in  informing  economic  analysis  of  CV 
responses, and ultimately WTP estimates. In particular, we exploit  it  in a 
finite-mixing context, contrasting it with conventional analysis that would not 
rely on this set of psychological constructs and; 
2)  the  relationship  between  PMT  constructs  as  they  cluster  in  each  of  the 
different  classes  we  empirically  identify  and  their  underlying  WTP 
distributions. 
Earlier studies have assessed and emphasized the role of familiarity with the purchase 
of  the  good under  valuation  (Carson,  1998)  and of  the  perceived  realism  of  contingent 
valuation surveys (Cummings and Taylor, 1998; Powe and Bateman, 2004). These are now 
consensually accepted as necessary ingredients for a valid measurement of WTP via CV. 
While  it  is  safe  to  assume  that  respondents  would  not  be  familiar  with  the  notion  of 
“purchasing”  biodiversity  protection  in  developing  countries,  during  the  focus  group 
discussions  conducted  for  the  development  of  our  survey  instrument  some  doubts  were 
expressed about the “practical deliverability” of biodiversity protection. 
In the absence of familiarity respondents are known to resort to heuristics (Schkade and 
Payne, 1994; DuBourg et al., 1997) and in our case this frequently leads to an assessment of 
the threats implied by biodiversity  loss. Threat  evaluation  also emerged as a dominating 
concern  in the focus group discussions of this study. Threat and risk assessment are  not 
uncommon  contexts  of  study  for  CV,  as  its  use  as  a  valuation  tool  for  goods  that  are 
implicitly requiring respondents to assess some kind of threat is rapidly expanding (Buzby, 
Ready, and Skees 1995; Henson, 1996 amongst others). In a stated preference exercise on 
biodiversity protection, dominated by low familiarity of the public good under valuation, one 
would generally expect respondents’ statements not to be perfectly consistent with rational 
choice theory (Payne and Bettman, 1993; Spash and Hanley, 1995), and hence show some 
anomalies  which  might  be  explained  by  including  in  the  analysis  a  select  number  of 
psychological constructs. In short, the aim of this paper is to explore and champion the use of 
PMT in such an empirical context. 
In  PMT  perceived  realism  and  threat  assessment  are  the  constructs  that  together 
constitute the main sources of intention analysis. Psychologists, however, have developed 
their own terminology for these constructs, and part of the objective of the paper is that of   3 
reconciling the terminology used in economics with that employed in  social psychology. 
What  is  important  to our purposes is that the PMT research programme developed tight 
protocols to empirically measure these constructs. A major feature of PMT in our context of 
study is that it predicts the existence of interactions between the two main dimensions of 
“realism” and “threat” perceptions, which result in well-identifiable payment intentions.  The 
basic question we ask is whether this framework effectively helps the econometric analysis of 
referendum CV responses by providing better grounds to explain differences, and perhaps 
some anomalies, in estimates of WTP distributions. In short: we try and identify the primary 
sources of preferences that lead to stated WTP by applying PMT constructs to the analysis of 
the observed responses. Although we use as background conventional  logit  analysis, this 
theory  enables  us  to  answer  some  remaining  questions  in  the  modelling  of  response 
heterogeneity  via  latent  class  analysis,  as  it  provides  underlying  reasons  for  finite 
heterogeneity in preferences. This is useful step forward, especially because economic theory 
alone does not provide many indicators to check if an answer to a WTP question results from 
rationally  well-behaved  preferences,  as  analysts  often  assume  that  this  is  a  fact.  In  this 
context, we find that supplementing conventional economic theory with theories from other 
social sciences is a fruitful avenue of investigation. 
 
1.1 Background and previous empirical work 
Theories from social psychology were applied to the analysis of CV responses and they were 
found  to  be  important  in  explaining  the  rationale  behind  patterns  of  WTP  answers.  For 
example, the theory of reasoned action (TRA) (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980) and its subsequent 
development theory of planned behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991) from social psychology have 
been used to explain CV responses (Ajzen and Driver, 1992; Barro, Manfredo, Brown, and 
Peterson, 1996; Kerr and Cullen, 1995).  
In  the  context  of  information  bias  the  theory  has  been  used  to  investigate  links 
between quality of arguments, personal relevance of the proposed public good and stated 
WTP (Ajzen, Brown, and Rosenthal, 1996). Pouta and Rekola (2001) used it to investigate 
attitudes,  subjective  norms,  and  perceived  behavioral  control  in  predicting  behavioral 
intention. Ajzen, Rosenthal, and Brown (2000) used it to explore perceived fairness and WTP 
for public goods. After Bishop and Heberlein (1986) had suggested that the norm activations 
model would be a useful framework to analyse WTP-answers, this was used in a qualitative 
evaluation of a CVM study to show the influence of social norms in stated WTP responses 
(Blamey, 1998). This body of literature significantly adds to the early evidence reported by 
the influential study by Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) that theories provided by Psychology 
can enhance the interpretation of values compared to pure micro-economic explanations. 
However, none of these studies directly addresses the issues of realism and threat 
assessment,  which  are  two  mental  dimensions  that  loom  important  in  biodiversity 
conservation.  
The role of perceived realisms in CV survey design for public goods has been studied 
under two prevalent aspects. One aspect of realism is motivated by the need to generate in the 
respondent  the  perception  that  the  results  of  the  survey  will  effectively  influence  policy 
decisions, thereby inducing a high subjective probability that the respondent’s answer will 
affect policy outcomes. This is what Green et al. (1998) call a “decisive  implementation 
frame”. However, the importance of this aspect of realism can be traced to the early work of 
Hoehn and Randall (1987), where the link to incentive compatibility and truthful revelation 
was first established.  Cummings and Taylor (1998) provide evidence that this aspect of 
“realness” is much more powerful when it is extended to include the likelihood of payment
1.  
Another aspect of realism that  has received recent attention within the context of 
scope effects is that concerning the perceived realism of the proposed scenario (or scheme).   4 
For example, in such context Powe and Bateman (2004) find a dummy variable representing 
“perceived realism” to be significant in explaining the probability of a “yes” response and 
draw the conclusion that “… tests for perceived realism should become a standard element of 
CV study design and analysis…”(page 259). Following this prescription we believe that the 
measurement of “perceived realism” can be improved by using psychological constructs. We 
therefore turned our attention to psychological theories addressing the role of such constructs 
in the context of motivating intentions and actions for the purpose of protection from some 
kind of loss, as we are interested in WTP for biodiversity loss. 
 
 1.2 This study in brief 
When  using  stated  preference  methods  to  value  global  biodiversity  we  are  faced  with  a 
challenging task, which is to elicit valid WTP responses for the reduction of its loss (Bishop, 
2003). When validity is an issue, we are not interested only in the result of economic choice 
(WTP), but also in the motivations or sources behind these choices. 
We  have  designed  the  CV  survey  instrument  so  as  to  include  the  individual 
measurements  of  constructs  from Protection  Motivation  Theory  (PMT).  This  theory  was 
originally developed to gain understanding on processes of response formulation and reasons 
for  choices  when  scenarios  require  respondents  to  assess  threats  and,  in  particular,  the 
possibilities to cope with a potential threatening event (Rogers and Prentice-Dunn, 1997). 
This is the terminology with which psychologists in this field would use to indicate what 
economists in the CV literature named “perceived realism”. In what follows we will use the 
term “coping” and “efficacy” as synonyms to indicate such specific forms of survey realism. 
Originally, PMT was  introduced by Rogers  in  1975 and it  has since been widely 
applied  in  psychology,  mostly  for  predicting  health-related  (Milne,  Sheeran,  and  Orbell, 
2000) and environmental-related behaviour (Gardener and Stern 1996; Hass, Bagley, and 
Rogers, 1975; Martens & Rost 1998; Martens 1999). We are not aware of applications of 
such theory in the context of stated-preference studies; hence this paper would be novel in 
this respect. 
We  argue  that  if  the  decision  context  under  investigation  requires  individual 
judgement on both perceptions of threat (which is loosely linked to uncertainty) and realism 
of the proposed protective action (in our case the proposed species conservation initiative), 
then PMT may offer useful insights on the sources of preference behind stated WTP (Menzel 
2004).  
A  consequence  of  PMT  is  that  the  respondent’s  perceptions  of  the  threat  of 
biodiversity loss jointly with that of efficacy of the proposed protective action are intuitive 
evaluation criteria to turn to when considering a payment for biodiversity conservation.  
Psychologists  have  long  maintained  that  PMT  is  an  adequate  framework  for  the 
investigation of intentions and behaviour with regard to environmental and health risk. We 
maintain that PMT deserves closer attention from stated preference practitioners because it 
provides a framework for the understanding of choices when scenarios require respondents to 
assess  threats  and  their  associated  ability  to  cope  with  such  threats.  On  the  other  hand, 
economic theory remains quite uninformative in this respect. Particularly so in view of the 
fact that a number of recent CV studies have investigated issues associated with private and 
public risks of various nature, such as global warming (Layton and Brown, 2000), potential 
benefits from the Kyoto Protocol agreement (Berrens et al. 2004), the value of statistical life 
(Johannesson, Johansson, and O'Conor, 1996; Krupnick et al. 2002), of road safety (Garrod 
et al. 2002; Scarpa et al. 2001), and of food-safety issues (Buzby, Ready, and Skees 1995; 
Henson, 1996; Canavari et al. 2004). 
More specifically, PMT might be of interest to applied economists because it can 
provide a framework for identification of preference groups in the treatment of heterogeneity.   5 
The structure of the constructs underlying each preference group and the relative dimension 
of the WTP values across groups can be used as an additional argument to validate this 
valuation method. Recent efforts in the treatment of heterogeneity have focussed on finite 
rather  than  continuous  mixing.  Validation  of  non-market  estimates  based  on  latent  class 
approaches (finite mixing) have attracted the economists’ attention (Provencher et al. 2002; 
Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002; Scarpa et al. 2003; Shonkwiler and Shaw, 2003). However, 
economic theory is silent about the number, sources and sizes of different preference groups, 
as these issues are not addressed by economics. Latent-class analyses are normally conducted 
in the absence of both a theoretical prediction on the number and structure of classes and of 
statistical  tests  capable  of  discriminating  across  competing  hypotheses.  Only  statistical 
criteria have been employed so far to get some guidance on this issue (Clogg and Goodman 
1984; Wedel and Kamakura 1999), which are often found to be inconclusive in practice (cfr. 
Scarpa and Thiene 2004). 
The advantage of PMT in this context is that not only does it propose a theory for the 
source of preference, but it also makes predictions on the structure of preference classes and 
it can be used to develop theoretical validity relations for the WTP values of each group. We 
hence find it convenient to employ latent class analysis centred on responses to carefully 
formulated PMT-based questions. The fact that PMT produces clear predictions about how 
perceptions of respondents should segregate into motivational classes provides analysts with 
expectations on  the  outcome of latent  class  analysis. The empirical analysis  in  our case 
supports the claim that such segregation produces a better statistical fit than that achieved by 




2 The original structure of PMT 
As  already  mentioned,  the  appraisal  of  a  threat  and  that  of  coping  with  such  a  threat 
(approximately realism in an economist’s terms) are the main constructs of PMT to predict an 
intention or behaviour. Both constructs are composed of sub-constructs as illustrated in figure 
1 and in what follows. 
 
Threat Appraisal  
The appraisal of a perceived threat is the result of the evaluation of sub-constructs. 
These include severity, vulnerability, fear, and the subjective probability of occurrence of the 
threatening event. In earlier applications of PMT these sub-constructs were combined in a 
multiplicative fashion (Beck et al. 1981). This assumption was later empirically rejected, so it 
is now often assumed that the relations between these sub-constructs are additive (Wolf, 
Gregory  and  Stephan  1986).  However,  our  approach  breaks  away  from  this  restrictive 
functional relationship, as we will describe in what follows. 
 
Coping Appraisal 
The appraisal of coping, instead, is the combined result of evaluating other two sub-
constructs, in addition to the cost of the coping action. The first sub-construct is response 
efficacy, that is, the “belief that a recommended action is able to avert an undesirable threat” 
(Rogers, 1983). The second is self-efficacy, or the “beliefs about ability and effort required to 
carry out a recommended (health) behaviour” (Rogers and Prentice-Dunn, 1997, cited by 
Houlding and Davidson, 2003). If one cannot conduct the recommended protective action by   6 
oneself  and  must  instead  rely  on  a  public  agency,  then  what  becomes  important  is  the 
perception  of  whether  the  agency  is  perceived  as  trustworthy  and  able  to  conduct  the 
recommended action (Shelton and Rogers, 1981).  
PMT  predicts  the  following  course  of  reasoning:  If  one  is  confronted  with  a 
potentially threatening event, first one conducts an individual appraisal of the threat. Then, 
the coping appraisal follows, focussing on whether the individual or the public agency can 
cope with it, how so and to which expenses. The combination of threat and coping appraisals 
leads to the individual choice of a coping strategy, which determines intention – in our case 
expressed in the reporting of a WTP in the interview – and ultimately in action (the payment 
of the WTP amount). As a basic principle it is assumed that perceived threat as well as a 
perceived ability to cope with such threat influence the probability of a given intention or 
action (Rogers and Prentice-Dunn, 1997). 
For the purpose of illustration we consider an extreme example: protection against a 
potential  earthquake.  According  to  PMT  one  would  first  consider  the  severity  of  an 
earthquake (e.g. the dimension of damage at one’s property and of personal injuries) and its 
likelihood (e.g. the probability that an earthquake occurs within, say, the next 2, 5, or 10 
years). After considering whether there is a possibility to prevent damages and/or injuries 
from  such  earthquake,  one  will  assess  one’s  abilities  to  conduct  the  possible  prevention 
activity, taking into account the costs of these actions. As a result, one will conduct possible 
actions to reduce or prevent the potential damaging event or decide to do nothing. 
Many empirical studies have been conducted to explore the implications of this theory 
and results have shown it useful in predicting both intention and action (Beck and Frankel, 
1981; Houlding and Davidson, 2003; McClendon and Prentice-Dunn, 2001; Martens, 1999). 
Further,  recent  meta-analyses  of  empirical  studies  based  on  PMT  show  that  variables 
concerning constructs relating to coping appraisal display a relatively superior performance 
in predicting intention or action than those measuring threat appraisal (Floyd, Prentice-Dunn 
and Rogers, 2000; Milne, Sheeran, and Orbell, 2000).  
Note, however, that PMT does not imply that a highly perceived threat always leads to 
a higher intention to act upon it. There are also significant interaction effects between threat 
and coping appraisals that need to be accounted for. These can enhance or detract from the 
overall outcome due to the single effects. For example, one may perceive the threat to be 
high, yet associate this with a low coping appraisal. PMT predicts this combination to lead to 
no  action,  the  so-called  “maladaptive  behaviour”  (Gardner  and  Stern,  1996;  Rogers  and 
Prentice-Dunn,  1997).  This  despite  a  perception  of  high  threat  alone  would  induce  the 
expectation of some degree of action. 
 
2.2 PMT coping strategies and expression of WTP 
In the light of the above, what we hypothesise in our study is that in formulating the response 
to  the  WTP  question  respondents  assess  the  utility  of  investing  money  for  preserving 
biodiversity in developing countries by considering mostly two features: 
1)  An assessment of the perceived threat to oneself and others in terms of the potential 
welfare-loss due to the absence of the proposed biodiversity protection policy and  
2)  perceived coping
2 of the proposed policy to produce the desired level of protection of 
biodiversity. 
Although each of these two constructs is multidimensional in nature, and is treated as 
such in this empirical study, one can simplify the postulated relationship in a reduced form as 
follows. Indicate the perceived threat assessment as a factor ranging in the population from a   7 
minimum of  q  to a maximum of  q  and the assessed efficacy (perceived realism) of the 
agency as a factor ranging from l  to l .  
Then, the respondent’s subjective assessments of q and l jointly determines the coping 
strategy and, as a consequence, the underlying valuation driving the response to the WTP 
elicitation question. PMT predicts that the joint density values for q and l display multi-
modality and cluster around focal values consistent with the four prevailing coping strategies.  
More explicitly, the theory predicts the existence of four prevailing coping strategies, 
each accompanied by an established terminology in the literature (table 1).  
1) When both values of q and l are below certain levels 
* * and q l we expect that the 
individual  formulates  a  low  expectation  for  the  utility  of  the  proposed  biodiversity 
conservation  policy,  so  as  to  express  a  low  or  zero  valuation.  Such  group  in  the  PMT 
literature is called “no action”, because the perceived utility of the proposed scheme is so low 
that no action is taken to protect oneself. 
2) Conversely, for those individuals who have both threat and efficacy assessments 
higher than 
* * and q l , and are hence focussed on the reduction of the threat, we expect that 
they formulate a high expectation for the utility of the proposed biodiversity conservation 
policy. Such group in the PMT literature is called “problem focussed”, because the perceived 
utility of the proposed protection policy  is at a sufficiently  high  level to justify a strong 
valuation. 
The remaining two groups are made-up by individuals whose assessments are mixed: 
they have either q < 
* * and q l l > or vice-versa. In either case we expect a WTP not as high 
as in the problem-focussed group.  
3) If threat is low and coping is high the person has no much motivation to act, or 
does so with a reduced effort. This coping strategy is termed “just to be sure”.  
4) If threat is assessed as high and at the same time perception of coping is low the 
person reacts “maladaptively”. So, the discomfort of a high threat is matched by a feeling of 
disempowerment. As a consequence, the reaction to the appraisal of the threat is not focussed 
on  its  reduction,  as  this  is  perceived  as  not  achievable.  But  it  can  be  –  for  example  – 
characterised by apparently irrational behaviours, such as trying to endure the threat, or to 
develop  fatalistic  attitudes,  or  to  live  with  fears,  anxieties  or  a  feeling  of  helplessness 
(Gardener and Stern 1996).  
The theory predicts that the intensity of intention (in our case stated WTP) leading to 
the action reducing the threat is higher for respondents adopting the “just to be sure” coping 
strategy than for those adopting the “maladaptive”. 
Of course, empirically speaking q and l are unobserved multidimensional factors, but 
they can be derived on the basis of responses to adequately formulated questions. We now 
illustrate how we have modified PMT survey techniques to this purpose. 
 
2.3 Modification to the CV survey and application of the theory  
2.3.1 Modification 
For the purpose of this study we departed from the conventional application of PMT, and 
modified  it  in  some  minor  points.  First,  following  Martens  (1999),  responsibility  was 
included as an additional construct. This seemed necessary, because PMT was originally 
developed for health psychology, and as a result it needed adjusting to the purpose of valuing 
a global public good. While it is quite self-evident that one feels responsible for its own 
health, in the case of biodiversity conservation it can be argued that the respondent can feel   8 
responsible also for other “entities” beyond oneself – a form of pure altruism. We assume that 
the degree of responsibility for these additional entities has an impact on both intention and 
action.  Evidence of the effect of responsibility towards others on WTP responses in CV was 
found before under various guises (Blamey 1995, Nyborg 2000, Shiell and Rush 2003). We 
defined  responsibility  as  the  extent  the  respondent  feels  the  duty  to  contribute  to  the 
protection of species in developing countries. (See Appendix for exact wording). 
Secondly,  we  looked  at  a  special  form  of  self-efficacy.  This,  in  conventional 
applications of PMT, is the ability to act to prevent a threat. In our case we had rather looked 
at the perceived result of paying for the prevention of loss of biodiversity. In other words, 
self-efficacy concerns the respondent’s opinion that the required amount the respondents is 
asked to contribute could have an influence on the protection of biodiversity, and is similar to 
the decisiveness concept that Green et al. (1998) find of high relevance in CV survey design. 
  Finally, vulnerability, which is part of the threat construct in PMT, although it was 
included in the study, resulted in responses that we eventually decided not to employ in the 
empirical analysis. This because a preliminary investigation persuaded us that respondents 
were not able to deal with probabilities of threat linked to the loss of biodiversity. 
 
2.3.2 Application 
It became apparent in the focus group discussions that  loss of biological diversity is  not 
perceived as a direct and current threat for German residents. Thus, the component of threat 
assessment dealing with severity (figure 1) was broadly defined. Current threat was limited to 
population of developing countries, while threat to the German respondent was investigated 
in terms of future effects. Fear was operationalized in terms of uneasiness at the thought of 
loss of biological diversity and loss of species in developing countries.  
Response efficacy was operationalized as the belief that 1) species can be protected at 
all or 2)  can be protected in  the  way proposed  in the scenario, respectively.  Any single 
respondent cannot implement a program to conserve species in developing countries. So an 
important component of realism, trust in the implementing organisation, was surveyed as part 
of the perceived coping. The costs result from monetary costs (bid level). For the relation 
between operationalized PMT constructs and survey questions see figure 2). 
 
3. Latent Class Model of WTP 
If PMT is informative in latent class analysis of WTP response distributions, then: 
1.  one  should  find  classes  with  patterns  of  responses  that  could  be  recognised  or 
reconciled with the PMT classes; 
2.  the membership probabilities to PMT-defined classes should significantly improve the 
fit  of  finite  mixing  specification  of  WTP  distributions  in  discrete-choice  CV 
responses. 
In  what  follows  we  outline  an  econometric  approach  developed  to  evaluate  such 
implications in our sample.  
3.1 Endogenous WTP classes  
The theory underlying the estimation of positive response probability to a given bid amount is 
well known (Hanemann and Kanninen, 1999; James and Cameron, 1987). Here we focus on 
the estimation of a finite mixing model of response probability. 
In the context of a sample of discrete choice responses to a WTP question one can rely 
on endogenous segmentation techniques to identify homogeneous response classes. Assume 
there are C classes of responses, each respondents has a probability of membership Pri(c). 
Then,  from  the  law  of  total  probability,  the  marginal  probability  of  observing  a  “yes”   9 
response from respondent i at a given bid level t
* can be written as Pr (“ yes ” | ti = t
* ) = 
* Pr( )Pr(" "| ) i i
c C
c yes t t
Î
= ￿ .  However,  such  a  model  is  rarely  employed  in  contingent 
valuation studies where it is more prevalent to assume that there is a unique, most often 
unimodal distribution of WTP values in the population, perhaps shifted by socio-economic 
factors  or  attitude  scores.  This  is  clearly  quite  restrictive,  although  justified  by  the  low 
informational content of binary responses. However, discrete-choice studies that account for 
finite  mixing  distributions  are  increasing  in  other  areas  of  non-market  valuation.  The 
consensus is that it may be an approach worth pursuing when – such as in this case – there 
are reasons to believe that preferences are clustered around focal values.  
Probabilities of  membership to  groups  can  be specified either  semi-parametrically 
(Hensher and Greene, 2003; Scarpa and Thiene, 2004), or conditionally on socio-economic 
covariates (Provencher et al. 2002; Scarpa et al. 2003; Scarpa et al. 2004) and simultaneously 
estimated  with the  underlying  choice model  using  full  information maximum  likelihood. 
Although the above are the conventional ways to derive membership probabilities, in the 
approach we employed here they are estimated separately and based on our responses to 
questions  designed  to  measure  PMT  constructs.  In  the  empirical  analysis  we  will  then 
compare our approach with the above more conventional ones to validate the role of PMT in 
identifying WTP classes. 
 
3.2 Deriving PMT-based class membership probabilities  
In our application the constructs necessary to apply the PMT are probed by means of PMT 
questions, the answers to which are expressed in a Likert scale. We therefore use a latent-
class modelling approach suitable to identify membership probabilities on the basis of such 
information. Although analyses of this type have a long history and wide scope of application 
in  quantitative  psychology  (Henry,  1999),  this  approach  is  relatively  uncommon  in 
economics.  Here  we  follow  the  approach  used  by  Morey  et  al.  (2004)  and  focus  on 
preference  heterogeneity  linked  to  PMT  constructs.  The  intent  is  first  to  endogenously 
identify  classes with  communalities  in  response  patterns, and the  individual  membership 
probability of each respondent to each class. The assumption is that individuals belonging to 
the  same  PMT  type  are  more  likely  to  produce  similar  patterns  of  response  than  those 
belonging to different classes. Secondly, we aim to check whether the observed response 
patterns of each class are consistent with those predicted to be dominating by PMT. Finally, 
because class membership is probabilistic, we estimate a willingness to pay model for each of 
the identified classes, and examine the pattern of mean WTP estimates against the features 
that PMT emphasize being part of each class. 
Define yi as a k × 1 vector with the observed pattern of responses to k attitudinal 
questions  for  individual  i.  Our  objective  is  that  of  first  estimating  the  unconditional 
probability of observing a given response to attitudinal question yki. For all questions we used 
a 1-5 Likert scale, ranging from expressions of “strong agreement” (score = 1) to “strong 
disagreement” (score = 5), and a “do not know” response (score = 0), giving a total of six 
potential responses. 
Pr(yki =j), j = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5        (1) 
Then  we  are  interested  in  the  same  type  of  probability,  but  conditional  on  the 
individual belonging to a given class c.  
Pr(yki =j|c), j = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; c = 1, 2, 3, …, C      (2) 
Where  the  total  number  of  classes  C  is  to  be  established  on  the  basis  of  the  empirical 
outcomes, but it is suggested to have a structure that can be rationalised around four types by 
PMT. Given class membership the response sequence is assumed to be independent, so that 
the unconditional response pattern probability is:   10 
1 1 1 1
Pr( ) Pr( )Pr( | ) Pr( ) Pr(  = | )
C C K J
i i ki
c c k j
c c c y jc
= = = =
= = ￿ ￿ ÕÕ y y     (3) 
  This approach can be extended to condition on socio-economic covariates (gender, 
education  level,  household  size,  etc.),  so  that  the  membership  probability  is  also  made 
conditional on socio-economic “types”. However, when we used this approach our likelihood 
values did not substantially improve. So, for the sake of simplicity, and to maintain focus on 
the main research issue, which is the matching of PMT predicted and observed classes, we 
omit to discuss the treatment of covariates here. 
  The objective is to estimate the (J × K × C) – K probability parameters that maximize 
the sample log-likelihood function: 
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  The constrained-maximizers of the above log-likelihood are: 
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Notice that this is just an estimate of the proportion of responses in class c which took a j 
Likert value in question k. 
The  unknown  components  of  the  above  formula  are  the  class  membership 
probabilities conditional on the pattern of response. These can be promptly derived by Bayes’ 
Law: 
1 1
















       (6) 
This  can  be  made  a  function  of  observables  by  substituting  equation  (3)  into  (6).  As 
illustrated in Morey et al. (2004) the estimation can be conveniently achieved by means of 
the E-M algorithm. Although a number of commercial software packages are available to 
implement E-M algorithms for the purpose of latent-class analysis, we obtained our results by 
purpose  coding  the  algorithm  in  Gauss  (available  from  authors  upon  request).  The  first 
iteration of the E-M algorithm starts with some guess for the individual Pr(c|yi), which are 
then fed into equation (5). This, in turn, is used to compute the log-likelihood in (3) and (4). 
The next iteration starts with new updated values obtained using equation (6) and repeats the 
process. Convergence is achieved when the difference between the difference in the  log-
likelihood values of iteration T and T-1 is lower than a predetermined threshold (we used 
10
-6).  The  process  is  completed  many  times  (250  in  our  case)  using  each  time  random 
starting values and only the results associated with the highest log-likelihood are kept. This 
because the maximization problem is ill-behaved and may achieve only a local maximum, 
which is a frequent occurrence when the number of latent classes C is high (larger than 3). In 
our search we allowed up to 7 preference classes. 
  When the above latent-class estimation is completed, each individual will have an 
estimated  membership  probability  conditional  on  her  own  specific  pattern  of  response 
Pr(c|yi).  We  call  these  PMT-based  membership  probabilities.  The  model  estimating  the 
probability of a  positive  discrete response to the proposed bid  amount in  the  contingent   11 
valuation  question  is  formulated  as  a  simple  logit  random  utility  model,  in  which  the 
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and Ai is the bid amount offered in the CV question to respondent i and “yes” is an indicator 
function of a positive response to the bid amount. The estimate for mean/median WTP for 
class c is therefore -ac/bc. Notice that each class is associated with a different marginal utility 
of income -bc. 
 
 3.3 Criteria for model fit and number of classes 
Although the total number of classes C with different response patterns to PMT questions is 
unknown,  PMT  predicts  the  presence  of  four  prevalent  patterns  of  responses.  From  the 
estimation  viewpoint  C  is  outside  the  space  of  the  estimable  parameters.  Because  the 
parameter values under the null are at the boundary of the parameter space the conventional 
specification  tests  used  for  maximum  likelihood  estimates  (likelihood  ratio,  Lagrange 
multipliers and  Wald  tests) are  not  valid  in  this  context. The regularity  conditions for a 
limiting chi-square distribution under the null are not satisfied.  
Wedel  and  Kamakura  (1999,  p.  91)  discuss  how  resampling  from  the  empirical 
distribution  is  feasible  but  very  impractical  because  of  the  computational  complexity  it 
involves. As guidance practitioners have used a variety of information criteria C = - 2lnL + J 
k where lnL is the log-likelihood of the model at convergence, J is the number of estimated 
parameters in the model, and k is a penalty constant. However, these criteria also fail some of 
the regularity conditions under the null for a valid test under the null (Leroux, 1992). We 
mention here only a selection. For k = 2 we obtain the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC); for 
k = ln(N+1) we obtain the consistent AIC (cnAIC); for k = ln(N) we obtain the Bayesian 
Information Criteria (BIC), which by construction is very similar to the cnAIC. Finally, for k 
= 2(J+1)(J+2)/(N-J-2) we have the corrected AIC (crAIC) (Hurvich and Tsai, 1989), which 
increases the penalty for the number of extra parameters estimated.  
The AIC is reported to over-estimate the number of groups, while the BIC does not do 
this,  asymptotically,  although  in  small  sample  sizes  it  tends  to  favour  too  few  groups 
(McLachlan and Peel, 2000).  
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The choice of number of classes that maximizes this criterion is associated with the best 
separation in terms of individual membership probabilities. 
 
4. Empirical Study  
4.1 Survey and data  
The population of the survey consists of German residents (native and foreign) aged 18 or 
older
3.  Because  of  the  large  population  of  German  residents  (66.4  million)  a  minimum 
sample  of  1,000  completed  questionnaires  was  set  as  a  target  to  ensure  a  sufficiently 
representative result. A telephone survey was selected as the interview technique, primarily 
because of limited financial resources. Telephone numbers were generated using the “random   12 
digit  dialling method”.  When contact was established  and  more than  one  individual  was 
available at the telephone unit, then the person who most recently had his/her birthday was 
asked to participate. 
In April and May 2001 a total of 12,000 random numbers were dialled. These resulted 
in 3,675 contacts with persons to whom the screening text was read, 58% of whom refused to 
participate in an interview. Out of the fraction who did engage in the phone interview only 
1.5%  dropped  out  during  the  administration  of  the  survey.  Eventually,  a  total  of  1,017 
respondents  completed  the  interview  (see  table  2)  each  providing  a  complete  set  of  the 
required responses.  
Of these 54.7% were women, 45.3% were men. The age group in the sample ranging 
from 25 to 45 was over-represented and people older than 65 were under-represented with 
respect to the national proportions (see table 3). Households with three or more than three 
people were overrepresented whereas one-person-households were highly underrepresented 
(see table A in Appendix). The average length of the telephone conversation was 16 minutes. 
The sample is more or less evenly distributed over different income categories and 
this seems comparable to the statistics from the last population census, however, as it  is 
always the case, the evaluation of the overall representativeness of the sample is problematic 
(see table B in Appendix). 
The formal education of the sample is hard to compare to the basic population. Data 
concerning  the  education  of  the  population  are  only  available  for  special  age  groups. 
According to the PISA-survey
4 19% between 25 and 64 years hold a university degree. In the 
sample almost 26% in this age group held a university degree. A university-entrance diploma 
or  an  advanced  technical  college  certificate  are  held  by  40%  of  the  population  living in 
Germany.
5 Whereas 46% of the respondents (all older than 18 years old) had reached at least 
this level of qualification. The sample is hence under-representative of German residents with 
lower education, perhaps due to a higher rate of drop-off in the screening process.  
 
4.2 Results from latent class analysis  
Our intent goes beyond simply addressing the issue of the number of classes, their relative 
proportions  in  the  population  and  their  individual  preference  structure.  We  also  wish  to 
identify the extent of the correspondence between the groups predicted by PMT and those 
empirically identified in the analysis. Further, we wish to learn more about these groups and 
the features of the implied WTP distribution of each class.  
 
4.3 Choice of questions for response patterns 
The survey instrument included a total of 12 questions designed to elicit responses suitable to 
characterise PMT types. However, interpreting the 6
12 combinations produced by 12 sets of 6 
Likert scale responses is quite a complicated endeavour, even when limited to a number of 
only 4-6 latent classes. We hence reduced the number of variables by dropping in turn each 
set of responses to a given question and using as a criterion the impact of such exclusion on 
the  log-likelihood  at  convergence.  If  dropping  a  given  set  produced  a  relatively  small 
reduction of the log-likelihood in equation 4, compared to the effects of dropping others, then 
this was taken as an indication that the set of responses was relatively uninformative. As a 
consequence the responses to these questions were eliminated. At the end of this lengthy 
procedure (each convergence required about 7 hours of computing time with 500 random 
starting points) – whose results are reported in table 4a – we were left with response to 
questions x2, x4, x8, x9, x11, and x12. (For the values of the goodness of fit criteria for the 
model including the select group of responses and the model with all responses see table 4b 
and 4c).   13 
Using these variables we maximize equation 4 varying the number of classes from 2 
to 7. Over this  range,  using  the  criteria  described  above,  we  fail  to  identify  evidence  in 
support of any particular number of classes. The criteria, in fact, did not allow a clear-cut 
identification of the optimal number of classes.  
Because we were primarily interested in informing the number of a finite points in a 
mixture of WTP distributions another objective was to find the number of PMT-based classes 
that best explains the WTP response model in (7), rather than the patterns of Likert scale 
responses in equation 4. So, the individual probabilities of class membership that are obtained 
in the maximizations of the latter were then used in the maximization of equation 7, which 
explains the distribution of WTP in each class. For this equation the average contribution to 
the sample log-likelihood associated with 5 classes is the highest in the range between 1 to 7 
classes (table 5, Model 1).  
We report here the mean log-likelihood values at convergence for estimates based on 
semi-parametric estimation, where only C-1 constants are estimated in the logit membership 
probabilities functions (Model 2); and based on logit membership probabilities conditional on 
various  selections  of  socio-economic  covariates  (Models  3  to  5).  In  particular,  we  used 
average household income and age (Model 3), and then we added to these two variables, one 
dummy for “having visited developing countries” (Model 4) and the “number of children in 
the respondent’s household” (Model 5). 
We  observe  that  PMT-based  membership  probabilities  produce  better  mean  log-
likelihood values than those produced by other conventional latent class models with logit 
membership probabilities for classes 2 to 5 (we fail to achieve convergence for any number 
of classes larger than 5), both when these were specified semi-parametrically in Model 2 
(constant only), and conditionally on select co-variates in Model 3 to 5. 
Because  of  the  different  sample  sizes  due  to  missing  data  on  socio-economic 
covariates it is not possible to formally test specifications, using, for example, the approach 
by Vuong (1989). However, since “the maximum likelihood of a model is a natural estimator 
of the distance between the model and the true distribution as measured by the Kullback-
Leibler  Information  Criterion”  (Vuong  1989,  page  326),  we  conclude  that,  with  the 
information in  hand, the  specification based on 5 PMT classes are best at  informing the 
segmentation of WTP distributions in the sample in hand.  
 
4.4 Identified classes and class characteristics 
We point the reader to tables 7 and 8 for the predicted probabilities of response to each 
question in members of each class as predicted by the 5 class model. We therefore focus our 
attention on the structure of these five and proceed to check that the four classes predicted by 
PMT are recognizable. 
Class A. It is the largest class (39% of the sample), and has the highest mean WTP (€ 
36). This class shows a pattern of probability of response consistent with what PMT defines 
as problem focused coping strategy. The probabilities of observing responses in agreement 
with the perception of threat (X2 and X4), responsibility (X12) and efficacy of the policy 
(X8, X9, X11) are all high.  
   Class B. This class is the smallest (3% of the sample) and shows a pattern of response 
clearly consistent with what PMT defines as no action coping strategy, and an attendant 
estimate of mean WTP of € 3. Probabilities of low scores are high along all dimensions.  
Class  C.  This  is  an  intermediate  size  class  (14%  of  the  sample).  The  pattern  of 
response probabilities to PMT questions is consistent with what PMT defines as maladaptive 
coping strategy, as members of this class have a very high probability of low scores in all 
variables, with the exclusion for the severity of threat, which shows a moderate score. The   14 
estimated mean WTP for the class is negative (€ -16), a value consistent with the features of 
this class, as we will discuss below in more detail. 
Class D. This class shows the second highest mean WTP (€ 28) and is the second 
largest class with (= 22% of the sample). The probabilities of low scores for perceived threat 
are high especially own-threat. Instead the probabilities of high scores on response with high 
efficacy  are  high,  but  those  for  trust  in  the  implementing  organisations  and  feeling  of 
responsibility are low. The combination of low threat and high perceived coping is consistent 
with what PMT defines as just to be sure.  
Class E. Like class D, this class represents 22% of the sample and has an estimated 
mean WTP of €22. But the pattern of probabilities is dominated by moderate probabilities in 
high scores of threat perception. Probabilities for high scores with perceived efficacy of the 
policy are high apart from those on trust on the implementing organisations. High to very 
high  score probabilities  are  found for  responses  of  high  feeling of responsibility  for  the 
protection of species in developing countries. As coping and perceived threat are high the 
class can be labelled as problem focussed. However, since the values are not as high as in 
class A we label it as moderate problem focussed.  
Table 6 gives an overview of the probabilities of response patterns for the five identified 
classes. 
 
5. Discussion  
5.1 Psychological versus economic rationality 
Given the results obtained, what can we conclude with regards to the behaviour of the WTP 
distributions  associated  with  each  class?  Do  they  reflect  anomalous  preferences?  Let  us 
examine each in turn. 
Problem-focussed case  
Respondents who behave “problem-focussed” and report high WTP values behave rationally 
from both  PMT and  economic  viewpoints. They  perceive a  high  threat  from  the  loss  of 
biodiversity, they believe that in general the loss of biodiversity can be reduced, and they 
believe  their  monetary contribution has  a positive  impact on the preservation of species. 
Thus, they are willing to pay a comparable high amount for biodiversity conservation in 
developing countries. Our data are consistent with such pattern in two of the separate classes 
we  identified  empirically:  the  “problem-focussed”  and  the  one  we  termed  moderate 
“problem-focussed”. 
No action case  
Similarly, the distribution of reported WTP for “no action” respondents’ can be considered to 
be  rational  in  terms  of  both  PMT  and  economic  theory.  These  respondents  do  not  feel 
strongly threatened by biodiversity loss and believe that not much can be done in practice to 
protect  biodiversity.  Accordingly,  they  report  an  average  willing  to  pay  amount  that  is 
comparatively low.  
Just to be sure case 
We find that the mean WTP for the distribution of respondents in the class “just to be sure” is 
lower than that for those in class “problem-focussed”, yet higher than that in the “no action” 
class. This, again, is rational in both PMT and economic theory terms. People who act “just to 
be sure” although they feel the threat from the loss of biodiversity in developing countries to 
be low, they do not extend this perception or belief to the possibility of protecting it. They 
believe species protection in developing countries to be generally viable, especially in terms 
of effectiveness of their own contribution.  
Maladaptive case   15 
Perhaps  the  most  interesting  class  in  terms  of  interpretation  of  the  associated  WTP 
distribution is the maladaptive class. People of this class express a high perception of threat 
and a low perception of coping, and are associated with a negative mean WTP. The obvious 
contradiction  of  a  moderate-to-high  threat  perception  and  a  negative  WTP  could  be 
interpreted as an anomaly. However, in our case we can explain it by the low perceived 
realism, which becomes apparent only because of using the PMT constructs. The surveyed 
information  that  these  respondents  do  not  believe  in  the  implementation  of  biodiversity 
protection or in the power of their own payment provides us the opportunity to interpret the 
associated WTP as the outcome of a rational calculation. 
With the identification of the maladaptive class we found evidence for alternative 
explanations of negative WTP. Those negative WTP for a public good such as biodiversity 
conservation would more likely be associated with strategic behaviour or protest responses. 
Identification and elimination of inconsistencies from the sample has been advocated in the 
past (e.g. Foster and Mourato, 2002), and would presumably be the conventional course of 
action. However, the additional articulated information PMT affords on perception of realism 
provides a plausible reason for such occurrence. Members of the class manifest high levels of 
scenario rejection due to perceived unrealism, or as psychologist would put it have a low to 
very low perceived “coping”. Furthermore, the latent class approach does not require the 
always-undesirable elimination of any group of respondents, but it elegantly accommodated 
all groups in an overarching statistical model. 
 
5.2 Realism 
Although during the interview great care was taken to emphasize that money will only be 
used to fund biodiversity protection, a noticeable proportion of the members of the sample 
expressed  their  low  realism:  they  could  not  be  convinced  of  the  possibilities  to  put  the 
protection  of  biodiversity  in  developing  countries  into  practice,  did  not  believe  in  the 
credibility of the implementing organisations and/or did not believe their payment would 
make a contribution to the protection of species. By decomposing realism based on PMT in 
sub-constructs response-efficacy, trust in implementing organisations and belief in the power 
of the own payment we get deeper insights in the characteristics of realism. We could identify 
the multidimensionality of realism and the different important of aspects of realism for WTP. 
Surprisingly lack of trust in the implementing organisations did not result in low mean WTP 
in the “problem-focussed” or “just to be sure” classes.  
The emphasis in realism research in CVM so far was placed on the respondents’ belief in the 
possibilities to implement the proposed scenario. With our operationalisation of realism we 
could show the importance in the belief of the power of the own payment for expressed WTP, 
which seems to be kind of ignored in CVM research so far.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In  this  study  we  emphasised  the  importance  of  perceived  realism  in  combination  with 
perceived threat as sources of systematic differences across classes of respondents and their 
mean WTP estimates for biodiversity conservation. We were inspired in our investigation by 
protection motivation  theory,  a  well-established and  successful  psychological  theory. We 
believe  that  researchers  interested  in  characterizing  the  sources  of  heterogeneity  in 
respondent behaviour should make an effort to bring to bear psychological findings in their 
economic analysis. In particular, we feel that with so much of the CV literature currently 
exploring the value of private and public health issues, PMT could represent a promising 
avenue for insightful findings in rationalising some common CV anomalies.   16 
The empirical evidence produced in our analysis is consistent with the predictions of 
PMT. The patterns of observed probability of responses associated with each class matches 
the expectations built on such theory, and so do the relative magnitudes of mean WTP for the 
value distribution in each class. There is much appeal in a theory that can predict the structure 
of a finite number of classes, especially in view of the poor guidance available from statistical 
criteria  suitable  to  discriminate  between  competing  hypotheses  on  class  compositions  in 
discrete choice models. 
Looking  at  the  characteristics of the identified  classes  and  according  to the PMT 
helped to understand reported WTP of class members. We can summarise that a very low 
perceived threat as well as low self-efficacy and responsibility resulted in a very low mean 
WTP – as predicted by PMT. Additionally, high scores for responsibility and self-efficacy are 
associated with high mean WTP. 
Furthermore,  the  theory  predicts  that  high threat  in  combination  with  low coping 
results in maladaptive behaviour. We could identify this effect very clearly with negative 
WTP for the class identified as “maladaptive”.  
Similarly,  to  other  PMT  applications  (Milne  et  al.  2000)  we  have  evidence  that 
perceived coping (response efficacy & self-efficacy) is more influential than perceived threat 
(severity & fears). In fact, the level of reported WTP is lower when perceived coping is low 
than when our measure of perceived threat is low. The suggestion is that self-efficacy has a 
higher influence on WTP than fear.  
In  the  case of  payments  for  biodiversity protection  the  application  of  PMT made 
different  forms  of  perceived  realism  apparent  for  stated  WTP.  Whether  the  respondents 
perceive the production of the good in question as plausible or not and whether the own 
payment is perceived as important for the production of the good in question plays a key role 
for stated WTP. In our case a class of people could be identified which did not believe in 
species protection in the described way or biodiversity protection in general as possible, or 
they did not believe in the power of their own payment. However, we can conclude that even 
the members of this group expressed well-behaved preferences in terms of their rationality.  
Powe  and  Bateman  (2004)  have  already  emphasised  perceived  realism  in  the 
construction of CV surveys. We present further empirical evidence for the importance of 
realism  and  highlight  its  multidimensionality.  Self-efficacy  and  response-efficacy,  as 
components of realism, should be examined in the design phase of CV studies and the main 
survey.  Using  PMT  enables  researcher  to  find  an  appropriate  wording  for  questions  to 
measure the different aspects of realism. A good wording is found when respondents do not 
realise that it is intended to test whether they believe in the scenario or not. If reasons for low 
realism  are  detected  in the design phase  of  CV  studies,  then  this  needs  to be  amended. 
Additionally, in the main survey respondents could be allowed to ask for extra information 
after the standard scenario presentation (see Fischer, 2004). Furthermore, respondents’ belief 
in the  effects  of  their  payment contribution ought  to be  measured in  early  stages  of  the 
interview to possibly strengthen the trust of respondents in the power of their own actions. 
   17 
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8. Appendix: 
x1 = “The loss of biodiversity in developing countries will in the long run affect the living 
conditions of people living in developing countries” 
x2 = inverted “The loss of biodiversity in developing countries will – if at all – derogate a 
few people on earth.” 
x3  =  “The  loss  of  biodiversity  in  developing  countries  will  negatively  affect  the  living 
conditions of future generations.” 
x4 = “The loss of biodiversity in developing countries will not derogate me personally. ”  
x5  =  “The  extinction  of  50.000  animal  and  plant  species  does  contribute  to  the 
danger/endangerment of the ecological equilibrium of the earth.” 
x6 = “I have a bad feeling, when I hear that animal and plant species are going to be extinct.” 
x7  = „It  is  a  pity  when  50.000  animal  and  plant  species  become  extinct  in  developing 
countries.“ 
x8 = “With advices and financial support from developed countries half of endangered plant 
and animal species can be protected. “ 
x9 = “The  governmental  and  non-governmental  organisations,  who  are  trying  to protect 
animal and plant species are confidential/trustable. “ 
x10 = “It is possible to reduce the extinction of species in developing countries. “ 
x11 =  “Payer” (1) „Even my payment matters for the protection of species in developing 
countries “ 
”not payer” (2) „A payment from me would not matter for the protection of species in 
developing countries. “ 
x12  =  “I  am  as  well  responsible  for  the  protection  of  50,000  endangered  species  in 
developing countries.”    22 
 
Appendix : Tables 







1-personhouseholds  19.4  36.7 
2-personshouseholds  31.2  33.7 
3-personshouseholds  17.1  14.2 
4-personshouseholds  20.3  11.1 
5 and more 
personshouseholds 
12  4.2 
Sources:  own  survey  and  Federal  Statistical  Office  Germany  (available  at 
http://www.destatis.de/basis/d/bevoe/bevoetab11.php)   23 
 
Table B: Household income in sample und basic population  
  Sample  Basic population 
Income categories  
(in €) 




categories (in €) 
Percent 
< 900 Euro  127  12  16  < 920  16.7 
900 - 1.250 Euro  107  11  13 
1.251- 1.600 Euro  138  14  17 
920-1534  27.7 
1.601 – 2.000 Euro  124  12  16 
2.001 – 2.500 Euro  107  11  14 
1534-2556  32.5 
> 2.500 Euro  197  19  25  >2556  22.9 
total  800  77  100     
Do not know/ no 
statement 
217  21       
(Sources: own survey and Federal Statistical Office Germany, Datenreport 2002, S. 212)   24 
Table 1: Coping strategies of PMT (source: Rogers and Prentice-Dunn 1997) 
    Threat 
    high  low 
high  Problem focused  Just to be sure 
Coping 
low  Maladaptive  No action 
   25 
Table 2: Sample report 
   Cases  Percentages 
 Telephone-Number Total  12000  100.0% 
 neutral outfalls  5177  43.1% 
 No connection  4537  37.8% 
 wrong connection / number has changed  83  0.7% 
 business telephone number  557  4.6% 
 Revised Gross I  6823  100.0% 
 other outfalls  3148  46.1% 
￿￿￿￿￿￿ no connection tone, no contact  1701  24.9% 
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿busy  86  1.3% 
￿￿￿￿￿￿ answering machine / mailbox  601  8.8% 
￿￿￿￿￿￿ fax machine/ modem (whistle)  541  7.9% 
￿￿￿￿￿￿ strong communication problems  219  3.2% 
 Revised Gross II  3675  100.0% 
 not neutral outfalls  2658  72.3% 
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿cancelled appointments  41  1.1% 
￿￿￿￿￿￿ person not available in given time period  
 (10 contact attempts) 
427  11.6% 
 ￿￿￿￿￿￿refusals  2135  58.1% 
 drop outs  55  1.5% 
 Realised Interviews  1017  27.7% 
 Source: own research and own calculations     
   26 
 
Table 3: Percentages of people in age groups in sample and basic population 
  Percent of sample  Percent of basic population 
15(18)-25  15  13 
25-45  45  36 
45-65  29  31 
65+  12  20 
Source:  own  research  and  own  calculations
Data for basic population: Federal Statistical Office (Germany), 
2002. 
   27 
 
Table 4a: log likelihood with and without dropping of each variable for the different class 
cases (variables in bold were kept in the final analysis) 
  4 classes  5 classes  6 classes  7 classes 
Complete set  -13976.49  13890.72  13810.82  13747.32 
Omitting X1  -12997.30  -12917.50  -12848.51  -12795.75 
Omitting X2  -12614.87  -12543.84  -12482.92  -12422.75 
Omitting X3  -13132.33  -13041.83  -12983.47  -12983.47 
Omitting X4  -12455.97  -12378.39  -12303.14  -12303.14 
Omitting X5  -12779.93  -12709.15  -12643.22  -12643.22 
Omitting X6  -13266.43  -13181.35  -13108.89  -13108.89 
Omitting X7  -13493.21  -13412.92  -13339.38  -13339.38 
Omitting X8  -12634.70  -12562.50  -12499.20  -12499.20 
Omitting X9  -12496.50  -12421.20  -12362.10  -12362.10 
Omitting X10  -12879.30  -12800.90  -12741.60  -12741.60 
Omitting X11  -12579.00  -12499.30  -12435.40  -12435.40 
Omitting X12  -12750.20  -12673.50  -12602.30  -12602.30 
   28 
 
 
Table 4b: Goodness of fit criteria for model including the select group of Likert responses 
(x2, x4, x8, x9, x11, x12) for cases of 2-7 classes 
Classes  log-lik.  AIC  CAIC_J  AIC_C  Entropy 
2  -8764.63  17525.26  17543.11  17519.26  0.5597 
3  -8644.10  17282.20  17308.98  17274.20  0.5959 
4  -8595.06  17182.12  18713.75  17305.55  0.6526 
5  -8552.59  17095.19  19009.73  17301.81  0.6738 
6  -8517.47  17022.93  19320.38  17343.79  0.7214 
7  -8484.93  16955.85  19636.21  17430.08  0.7312 
 
 
Table 4c: Goodness of fit criteria for model with all variables 
Classes  log-lik.  AIC  BIC  AIC_C  Entropy 
2  -14306.28  28608.57  29443.52  28641.56  0.751 
3  -14090.47  28174.94  29427.37  28253.84  0.7512 
4  -13976.49  27944.99  29476.4  28068.41  0.7690 
5  -13890.73  27771.45  29685.72  27978.08  0.7638 
6  -13810.82  27609.63  29906.75  27930.48  0.7919 
7  -13747.32  27480.65  30160.62  27954.87  0.8037 
   29 
Table 5: Comparisons of mean log-likelihood values across latent class WTP logit models 
 
    Model1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
classes  PJ  PMT-based  Constant-only HH_INC+AGE  +knowdev  +kids 
2  5  -0.5844  -0.6216  -0.5896  -0.5872  -0.5767 
3  8  -0.5224  -0.6215  -0.5838  -0.5773  -0.5742 
4  11  -0.5451  -0.6213  -0.5812  -0.5741  -0.5622 
5  14  -0.5183  -0.6207  -0.5799  -0.5537  -0.5279 
6  17  -0.5293  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
7  20  -0.5345  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.   30 
Table 6: Table: Probabilities of “I completely agree” plus “I fairly agree” answers to PMT 
questions for members of the five classes 
  A  B  C  D  E 
N  392  35  142  221  227 
%  39  3  14  22  22 
WTP  36  3  -16  28  21 
Threat           
Severity – 
others  0.8  0.54  0.54  0.51  0.77 
Severity – self  0.76  0.22  0.38  0.27  0.6 
Coping           
response 
efficacy  0.81  0.47  0.26  0.7  0.73 
Trust in 
organisations  0.45  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.36 
Self efficacy  0.83  0.23  0.22  0.73  0.65 
           
Responsability  0.91  0.48  0.33  0.59  0.8 
PMT group  Problem 






> 0.75  0.6 – 0.76  0.45-0,59  0.3-0.44  < 0.29   31 
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1 Although for incentive-compatibility Green et al. (1998) note that the payment vehicle must be decoupled, that 
is, “if a good is provided, then its cost will be distributed across all consumers by a formula (such as an income 
tax) surcharge that does not depend on the subject’s CV response.” (page 88). 
2 Short of cost considerations this maps into “perceived realism” in an economist’s terms. 
3 One part of the basic population is its eligible voters. In Germany people are eligible to vote when they turn 
18.  1998:  60.8  million  (1998).  (Federal  Statistical  Office,  Bundeswahlleiter).  The  other  part  of  the  basic 
population are the foreigners, who are 5.775 million (2001), 5.561million (1998) people aged 18 and older 
(Federal Statistical Office) 
4 OECD: http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00036000/M00036064.pdf 
5 Federal Statistical Office http://www.destatis.de/basis/d/biwiku/bildab1.htm 
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